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INTRODUCTION
“How much did you make at your previous place of employment?”
It is one of the questions applicants and new employees dread the
most.1 Encountering this question is always a bit awkward because,
without any indication of what the employer thinks is an appropri-
ate salary range, you may worry that a prospective employer will
perceive your previous salary as either too high or too low. However,
this question is not just uncomfortable to answer; the question of
salary history also serves as a persistent barrier to gender-based
wage equality.2
Upon graduation from college, women make an average of $2.99
less per hour than recent male college graduates, despite women
attaining a higher rate of bachelor’s degrees.3 When women already
start out on a lower rung, or return to the workforce after taking
time to raise a family, their salary history will continue to be less
than their male colleagues who began with a higher salary.4
Take Aileen Rizo,5 for example. After four years of serving as a
math consultant for the Fresno County public schools, Rizo found
out that she was making 20 percent less than a male colleague who
was only recently hired, was less educated, and had less experience
than she did.6 She then learned from human resources that her
1. See Renee Morad, Job Interview: Will The Salary History Question Become Extinct?,
FORBES (July 31, 2017, 11:23 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/reneemorad/2017/07/31/job-
interview-will-the-salary-history-question-become-extinct/#29a78b9127dd [https://perma.cc/
G47U-42YD].
2. See Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R. Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in
Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 159, 163 (2011) (describing when “market
excuses” such as prior salary are used to pay men and women differently).
3. TERESA KROEGER & ELISE GOULD, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE CLASS OF 2017, at 25 (2017),
https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/124859.pdf [https://perma.cc/UDP6-6CZS].
4. Christina Cauterucci, Equal Pay Legislation Banning Salary History Questions is
Absolutely Based in Data, SLATE: XXFACTOR (Apr. 14, 2017, 3:41 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/xx_factor/2017/04/14/equal_pay_legislation_banning_salary_history_questions_is_ba
sed_in_data.html [https://perma.cc/FH58-5CSE].
5. Yuki Noguchi, Proposals Aim to Combat Discrimination Based on Salary History, NPR
(May 30, 2017, 11:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/30/528794176/proposals-aim-to-com
bat-discrimination-based-on-salary-history [https://perma.cc/P928-GLAL].
6. Id.
2018] SALARY HISTORY SHOULD BE HER STORY 703
current salary was based on her previous salary and could not be
changed.7
When hiring a new employee, Fresno County takes the new
hire’s most recent salary and increases it by about 5 percent to
place them on a level within the County’s salary classification
bracket.8 Although her prior salary was lower than even the lowest
level, this newly hired male colleague started at a much higher
salary level because of his higher previous salary.9 More education
and experience could not change her predicament if her previous
salary did not also reflect that education and experience.10 As long
as her previous salary bound her, Rizo could not do anything to
influence her current salary, regardless of what she could offer
Fresno County.11
This experience is not exclusive to Rizo. Since 1980, Asian women
continue to make only $0.87 per dollar earned by white men; white
women make $0.79; black women make only $0.63; and Hispanic
women make a mere $0.54 on the dollar in the United States when
compared to white men.12 Moreover, if a woman takes time off to
start a family or is paid less at a previous job because of negotiation
bias13 or gender bias, then that salary will continue to follow her
to new places of employment, regardless of skill or experience level,
as long as her employer uses prior salary to determine starting
wages.14
7. Id.; see also Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc).
8. Rizo, 887 F.3d at 457.
9. Id. at 458.
10. Noguchi, supra note 5 (“I couldn’t educate myself out of being paid less, I couldn’t get
more experience or be in the job market longer to break that cycle.... Because low wages will
follow you wherever you go as long as someone keeps asking you how much you were paid.”).
11. Id.
12. Courtney Connley, Reminder: Today Isn’t Equal Pay Day for Black, Latina, or Native
American Women, CNBC (Apr. 10, 2018, 2:19 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/10/today-
isnt-equal-pay-day-for-black-latina-or-native-american-women.html [https://perma.cc/M2YE-
E2YK] (noting that this gap persists even when correcting for education and other demo-
graphics).
13. See generally Christine Elzer, Wheeling, Dealing, and the Glass Ceiling: Why the
Gender Difference in Salary Negotiation is Not a ‘Factor Other Than Sex’ Under the Equal Pay
Act, 10 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1 (2009) (discussing negotiation bias against women and the
perception that women who aggressively negotiate are not likable and are too entitled).
14. Cauterucci, supra note 4.
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“Anchoring bias”—the tendency for people to focus on and over-
emphasize the first piece of information they receive, such as salary
history—accentuates this discrepancy.15 A low salary history can al-
so prevent future job opportunities because employers may assume
a candidate is not as qualified as others if her previous salary is low-
er than anticipated.16 Katie Donovan, coauthor of the Massachusetts
statute restricting salary history questions, says recruiters often use
prior salary to eliminate applicants in a large job pool.17 Employers
view salary history as “too high, we can’t afford you; too low, you
must be bad at your job, or you’re not a high enough level.”18 These
factors allow the wage gap cycle to continue unbroken far into a
woman’s career.19
For this reason, states and cities across the country have passed
or proposed a ban on employers asking a new employee or applicant
about previous salary.20 Massachusetts was the first state in the
country to pass a ban on salary history.21 California,22 Delaware,23
Oregon,24 the City of San Francisco,25 New York City,26 and the City
of Philadelphia27 have since taken similar votes and passed legis-
lation which take effect in 2018. New York State28 has proposed a
similar bill. However, the City of Philadelphia now faces legal
challenges to its ordinance.29
15. Id.




20. See Noguchi, supra note 5.
21. Chris Weller, Cities are Finally Banning Employers from Asking Everyone’s Least-Fav-
orite Interview Question, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2017, 12:00 PM), http://www.businessinsider.
com/cities-ban-salary-question-in-interviews-2017-4 [https://perma.cc/Q53D-GRTS].
22. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3(a)-(b) (West 2018).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 709B(6)(1)-(2) (2017).
24. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 652.220(1)(d) (West 2017).
25. See S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33J, § 3300J.4 (2017).
26. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25) (2017).
27. PHILA., PA., PHILA. CODE § 9-1131(2)(a) (2017).
28. Assemb. B. 2040C, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
29. Fabiola Cineas, Chamber Says CHOP, Drexel Would Suffer Under Philadelphia’s Wage
Equity Law, PHILA. MAG. (June 15, 2017, 9:07 AM), https://www.phillymag.com/business/2017/
06/15/philadelphia-wage-equity-law-chamber-of-commerce-chop-drexel/ [https://perma.cc/4G
XD-ENA3]. The district court recently applied the Central Hudson test to determine whether
the law passed intermediate scrutiny and found that salary history questions are commercial
speech. Chamber of Commerce for Greater Phila. v. City of Phila., No. 17-1548, 2018 WL
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The Philadelphia City Council unanimously passed an ordinance
banning salary history without any challenges during the proposal
and debate stages.30 However, the Chamber of Commerce and thir-
teen local businesses have since filed suit against the city, alleg-
ing that the ban infringes their First Amendment rights to free
speech.31 This litigation and free speech claim on behalf of busi-
nesses in Philadelphia provides an informative case study to eval-
uate the merit of employer free speech claims and understand how
salary history regulations are not only lawful, but crucial.
The businesses’ free speech claim is contingent on courts’ views
of a corporation’s free speech rights.32 Although courts have upheld
corporations’ free speech rights in varying degrees over the past
century,33 not all speech is created equal.34 Some speech, such as
commercial speech, is less protected from regulation than other
forms of speech based on the substantial government interest in-
volved.35 In order for courts to uphold a regulation of commercial
speech without violating the First Amendment, the regulation must
directly advance the government’s interest and be narrowly regu-
lated to serve that interest.36 This standard is a lower bar than the
2010596, slip op. at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 30, 2018). However, the court found that the City failed
to offer enough evidence that the ban on wage history inquiries would reduce the gender pay
disparity. See id. at *11. The court also found that businesses may not rely on wage history
during the employment process or drafting of contract. Id. at *23. As discussed later in this
Note, the Supreme Court has not required empirical evidence to find that a regulation directly
advances the government’s interest, and has even relied on “commonsense judgment.” See
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993); see also discussion infra Part
IV.B.1.
30. Cineas, supra note 29.
31. Id. 
32. Vikram David Amar & Alan E. Brownstein, Philadelphia’s Ban on Employers Asking
Job Applicants for Salary History Raises Interesting First Amendment Questions, VERDICT
(Jan. 27, 2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/01/27/philadelphias-ban-employers-asking-job-
applicants-salary-history-raises-interesting-first-amendment-questions [https://perma.cc/5M
SH-D6ZF].
33. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (listing many of the cases where
the Court found corporations to have free speech rights). 
34. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81.
35. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563-
64 (1980).
36. Id. at 564.
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strict scrutiny analysis applied to other speech, such as political
speech.37
Hence, whether courts in Philadelphia or in cities and states
across the country classify salary history questions as commercial
speech, warranting a lower standard of constitutional protections,38
is a question of great importance to working women in the United
States. This classification as commercial speech is critical, as it will
allow the government to regulate certain areas of strong public in-
terest, such as factors contributing to the gender wage gap, without
being struck down by the courts in favor of broader corporate
protection.39
This Note argues that questions of salary history—whether asked
in a job interview or of a new hire—are commercial speech and
should be regulated as such without being subject to strict scrutiny.
Part I explores definitions of commercial speech and explains why
salary history should be classified as such. Part II reviews the
Supreme Court’s test for commercial speech regulations and then
explains why this level of scrutiny remains indispensable to the
commercial speech analysis. Part III outlines the substantial gov-
ernment interest in narrowing and eventually eliminating the gen-
der wage gap through means such as salary history bans. This Part
also explains why the current framework is insufficient to obtain
wage equality and thus why these new laws are necessary. Part IV
argues that these salary history laws are sufficiently narrow in di-
rectly advancing the government interest and restrict commercial
speech in a reasonably confined way. Regardless of the outcome of
the litigation in Philadelphia, this Note is important for understand-
ing the regulations that are sweeping the country with regards to
employer questions about salary history as commercial speech and
why the regulation of these questions is critical for eliminating
factors that contribute to the wage gap.
37. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) (finding that com-
mercial speech warrants less protection than other types of speech).
38. See id.
39. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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I. DEFINING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Commercial speech is an important classification because it is
protected and regulated differently than other types of speech,
such as political speech.40 This Part first examines the commercial
speech doctrine and what courts have classified as commercial
speech. Then it examines how the job process, in particular in-
terviews, relates to other forms of commercial speech to understand
how salary history fits into this classification.
A. Understanding Commercial Speech
In order to establish employer questions about salary history as
commercial speech, it is important to understand what commercial
speech is. However, the definition of commercial speech in legal
scholarship lacks a degree of certainty and clarity.41 Despite all of
the Supreme Court’s discussion on commercial speech, nowhere
does the Court lay out a “bright line [rule] for distinguishing a
protected employer right from a prohibited employer action.”42 The
Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public
Service Commission of New York described commercial speech as
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.”43 However, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., the Court seemingly
defined commercial speech as “a communication which does no more
than propose a commercial transaction.”44 Thus, the Court lacks a
40. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 64 (noting that the Court only upholds non-commercial
restrictions in limited circumstances).
41. Victor Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153,
1154 (2012); see also TAMARA R. PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT: COMMERCIAL
EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 21-22 (2012) (writing that the Court tends to care more about
whether the government may regulate the speech than if the speech is actually commercial
speech). 
42. Paul Barron, A Theory of Protected Employer Rights: A Revisionist Analysis of the
Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act, 59 TEX. L. REV. 421, 453
(1981).
43. 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
44. 425 U.S. 748, 776 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring); see also PIETY, supra note 41, at 21;
Erin Bernstein & Theresa J. Lee, Where the Consumer Is the Commodity: The Difficulty with
the Current Definition of Commercial Speech, MICH. ST. L. REV. 39, 55-56 (2013).
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comprehensive approach to determine what types of speech are
commercial.45
In Virginia State Board, the Supreme Court classified drug pre-
scription information as commercial speech when it determined that
this information was a matter of public interest.46 The Court based
this finding on the indispensable nature of “the free flow of commer-
cial information” to keep the public “intelligent and well informed.”47
The Court’s focus in Virginia State Board on protecting drug ad-
vertisements as commercial speech for their value to the public
suggests that it defines commercial speech relative to the value for
the listener, or society.48 This has led scholars to note that protec-
tion of commercial speech is limited to a listener-based approach,
where commercial speech is protected for its value to the listeners,
and not to protect the speaker.49 Thus, the Court focuses on the
interests of the audience to protect commercial speech by allowing
listeners to receive information that companies have previously
withheld (for example, compelled disclosures) or compensating
listeners for a power and information differential between the
speaker and the listener.50
In an employment context, there is a power differential in com-
munications between employers and employees “in which workers
are comparatively disadvantaged in terms of information and
power.”51 For instance, employers are aware of how integral an
employee’s work is to an operation or how much income a particular
employee’s work generates for the business; in contrast, the
45. See Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First
Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31, 35 (2016).
46. 425 U.S. at 764-65.
47. Id.
48. See PIETY, supra note 41, at 11 (calling this aspect of commercial speech “distinctive”);
Jennifer L. Pomeranz, No Need to Break New Ground: A Response to the Supreme Court’s
Threat to Overhaul the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 389, 401 (2012)
(noting that only the speaker in this situation can “verify [the information’s] accuracy”).
49. Bernstein & Lee, supra note 44, at 71-72; see also Norton, supra note 45, at 46
(discussing how commercial speech is protected for its informational value to listeners);
Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 401 (explaining that the Court found protection for commercial
speech primarily important to “support intelligent and well-informed consumer decisions”).
50. See Brudney, supra note 41, at 1165 (noting “a large asymmetry between the speaker
and” listener with regards to information of the transaction).
51. Norton, supra note 45, at 37.
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employee lacks this information.52 Therefore, commercial speech
protection offers a way to protect the listener—such as an employee
in a corporate context,53 or a person looking for drug prescriptions,54
and ensures that the listener has full access to necessary informa-
tion in a particular situation.55
B. Classifying Salary History as Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court has not explicitly said whether questions
during an interview, such as those related to salary history, con-
stitute commercial speech.56 Commercial speech cases have typically
involved pamphlets,57 advertisements,58 drug prescription informa-
tion,59 and other items that are part of commercial transactions
between parties who are usually buying and selling.60 A narrow view
of commercial speech would limit the doctrine solely to speech that
is an offer or acceptance of a sale of goods.61
However, there is precedent to find that interviews as part of the
job recruitment process also represent commercial speech. The Su-
preme Court held in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations that a newspaper discriminated based on sex
when it reported different job openings in male and female-desig-
nated columns.62 The Court not only found that this was an illegal
activity because the newspaper discriminated in employment on the
basis of sex, but the Court also concluded that the postings discus-
sed commercial activity and therefore were commercial speech.63
52. See id. at 37-38.
53. Id. at 37.
54. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65
(1976).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 46-47. 
56. See Helen Norton, You Can’t Ask (or Say) That: The First Amendment and Civil Rights
Restrictions on Decisionmaker Speech, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 727, 745 (2003).
57. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66 (1983).
58. See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
59. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557-58 (2011); Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at
750.
60. See PIETY, supra note 41, at 22.
61. See Brudney, supra note 41, at 1155-56.
62. 413 U.S. 376, 379-81 (1973).
63. Id. at 388.
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Thus, the Court found that “proposals of potential employment ...
constituted core commercial expression.”64 Lower courts have fol-
lowed this holding to include the job recruitment process in the defi-
nition of commercial speech for speech such as “job advertisements,
interviews, and other job-related negotiations (which ... generally
include information about the terms and conditions of employ-
ment).”65
In addition, circuit courts have classified solicitations for employ-
ment as commercial speech, as seen in Centro de la Comunidad
Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay.66 In that 2017 case,
the Second Circuit determined that questions related to employ-
ment qualify as commercial speech.67 In fact, the court explicitly
stated that “[i]t is well settled that speech that is no more than a
proposal of possible employment is a ‘classic example’ of commercial
speech.”68 In Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, the Ninth Circuit also
found that solicitations for work were related to a commercial trans-
action and therefore were commercial speech.69 Hence, viewing
commercial speech as only applicable to information and offers to
buy or sell goods is overly restrictive; the lower courts have ex-
tended Pittsburgh Press to include “communications involving
recruitment efforts, advertising, interviews, and other negotiations”
as commercial speech due to the “close relationship to job ... transac-
tions.”70
64. Norton, supra note 56, at 745. Commercial speech includes questions as well as asser-
tions. Tung Yin, How the Americans with Disabilities Act’s Prohibition on Pre-Employment-
Offer Disability-Related Questions Violates the First Amendment, 17 LAB. LAW. 107, 114
(2001).
65. Norton, supra note 45, at 48; see also Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust
Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2017) (pertaining to job solicitations);
Valle del Sol Inc. v. Whiting, 709 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 2013) (relating to offers of employment). 
66. 868 F.3d at 112.
67. See id. (finding that the ordinance restricting employment solicitations targets
commercial speech).
68. Id. (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973)).
69. 709 F.3d at 818 (finding that the speech relates to hire and transport, so “all affected
speech is either speech soliciting a commercial transaction or speech necessary to the con-
summation of a commercial transaction”).
70. Norton, supra note 56, at 745 (emphasis added).
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These cases demonstrate that commercial speech extends to
speech during the employment process.71 Salary history questions
are part of the job recruitment and employment process.72 Moreover,
they propose a commercial transaction between two parties73 in that
one seeks to offer employment and the other to accept. Questions
about salary history also relate to the “economic interests of the
speaker and its audience” because they concern the economic rela-
tionship between an employer and a potential or new employee.74
In addition, as discussed above,75 the Court did not recognize pro-
tections for commercial speech in order to protect the speaker, in
this instance corporations.76 Instead, the Court defined commercial
speech with respect to its value to listeners and the public.77 The
listeners in the context of the employment process are prospective
or new employees who are at an informational disadvantage com-
pared to employers.78 A prospective employee does not have access
to the employer’s preference for certain hiring factors, how much a
company can afford to pay in compensation compared to the mini-
mum salary offered, other employees’ salaries, how the company
uses salary history information, or other information an employer
possesses during the hiring process. Hence, when an employer, as
the speaker, asks about salary history, the prospective employee, as
the listener, responds at an informational disadvantage.
Therefore, protecting a corporation’s right to ask questions with-
out restriction in the employment process mistakenly protects the
71. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d at 107; Whiting, 709 F.3d at 814.
72. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 32 (noting that the salary history ban is not a
general one, but rather one “in the context of a hiring process” and therefore “might be viewed
as a regulation of expression that is incident to the conduct of hiring employees”).
73. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976) (holding that commercial propositions do not lack all protection).
74. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980); see also Yin, supra note 64, at 115-16 (noting that questions in an interview are
commercial speech because there is a proposal of a commercial transaction between employer
and potential employee).
75. See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
76. See Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 143 (“The commercial
speech doctrine was forged as a tool of consumer protection to secure the value of commercial
speech to society, not to ensure the autonomy interests of commercial speakers.”).
77. See id. at 147.
78. Cf. Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union Representation Elections, and the First
Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 401 (1995).
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speaker’s and not the listener’s interests, which is contrary to the
primary purpose of the commercial speech doctrine.79 Any protection
of salary history questions as commercial speech should be only jus-
tified with respect to the interests of the employees as the listeners
and not to protect the corporations as the speakers.80 Moreover,
lower courts demonstrate that speech as part of the employment
process is commercial speech following the Supreme Court’s holding
in Pittsburgh Press.81 Therefore, questions about salary history
should be considered commercial speech because of the role these
questions play in the job recruitment process and the economic
transaction they represent between an employer and a prospective
or new employee.
II. REGULATING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
In addition to defining commercial speech, it is also critical to
understand how the government may regulate this speech. The
Court’s decision in Virginia State Board was the first to recognize
constitutional protection from government regulations for commer-
cial speech.82 Central Hudson followed, and distinguished permissi-
ble restrictions of speech from overly burdensome regulations.83 A
law may regulate commercial speech if it passes the analysis that
the Supreme Court established in Central Hudson.84 This Part ex-
amines the protection the Court grants to commercial speech in Vir-
ginia State Board and the test it established for regulating such
speech in Central Hudson.
79. See PIETY, supra note 41, at 11 (writing that to do so “would turn the doctrine on its
head”).
80. Norton, supra note 45, at 37.
81. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
82. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 749-
50 (1976); John C. Coates IV, Corporate Speech & the First Amendment: History, Data, and
Implications, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 241 (2015).
83. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 563
(1980).
84. See id. at 564.
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A. Virginia State Board and Protection for Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court first articulated protection for commercial
speech in the 1976 landmark case, Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.85 The plaintiffs
claimed that the law prohibiting drug discount advertisements
violated their First Amendment right of free speech because cus-
tomers had the right to receive this information.86 For the first time,
the Court expressly held that the fact that speech is “commercial
speech” does not preclude protection.87 The Court recognized
protection for the speech at issue because of its content and the
strong societal “interest in the free flow of commercial informa-
tion.”88
However, in holding that commercial speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection, the Court did not hold that the government
may never regulate commercial speech.89 To the contrary, the Court
even went so far as to declare that it has “often approved restric-
tions” if these restrictions “serve a significant governmental inter-
est” and allow for other means of communication.90 This language
paved the way for the Court’s understanding of permissible regu-
lations of commercial speech in Central Hudson.
B. The Central Hudson Test and Intermediate Scrutiny
In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Com-
mission of New York, the Supreme Court laid out a test for de-
termining when regulations of commercial speech are permissible.91
This test is imperative in understanding why intermediate scru-
tiny, rather than strict scrutiny, is the standard for analyzing
85. 425 U.S. at 749-50 (considering a prohibition on pharmacists from advertising drug
discounts for prescription drugs).
86. Id. at 754.
87. Id. at 761. 
88. Id. at 763-65. 
89. Id. at 770 (“In concluding that commercial speech ... is protected, we of course do not
hold that it can never be regulated in any way. Some forms of commercial speech regulation
are surely permissible.”).
90. Id. at 771.
91. 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
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commercial speech.92 A modern trend toward favoring the corporate
use of the First Amendment to counteract government regulations
has challenged the level of scrutiny applied to commercial speech.93
However, recent court decisions that continue to apply the Central
Hudson test and intermediate-level scrutiny,94 along with the com-
mercial speech doctrine’s purpose of protecting public interest,95
emphasize that Central Hudson remains controlling precedent when
assessing commercial speech regulations.
1. What Makes a Regulation Permissible
Four years after Virginia State Board, the Court established a
test for determining when the government may regulate commercial
speech.96 In that case, Central Hudson, the Public Service Commis-
sion had banned electrical utility companies from promoting elec-
tricity during the national energy crisis, and the plaintiffs argued
this ban violated their free speech rights.97 The Court declared that
commercial speech is afforded less protection than other forms of
speech under the First Amendment.98 Protection of commercial
speech “turns on the nature both of the expression and of the gov-
ernmental interests served by its regulation.”99 The Court set forth
a four-part analysis for evaluating commercial speech restrictions.100
First, the Court determined whether speech is misleading or
false, which precludes the speech from First Amendment protection
altogether.101 Second, the Court asked “whether the asserted govern-
mental interest is substantial.”102 Third, if the interest is substan-
tial, then the regulation must “directly advance[ ] the governmental
92. See Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 402, 413.
93. John C. Coates IV & Ron Fein, Corporations are Perverting the Notion of Free Speech,
NEWSWEEK (Aug. 4, 2015, 4:42 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/corporations-are-perverting-
notion-free-speech-359785 [https://perma.cc/TJ86-Z5RD].
94. See cases cited infra note 133.
95. See infra text accompanying note 137.
96. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
97. Id. at 558.
98. Id. at 563.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 566.
101. Id. 
102. Id.
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interest asserted.”103 Finally, the Court determined whether the reg-
ulation “is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that in-
terest.”104
Hence, commercial speech is not free from all regulation.105 The
First Amendment only protects commercial speech when the govern-
ment does not have a substantial interest to regulate and has not
done so in a narrowly tailored way.106
2. Intermediate Scrutiny for Regulations
Even when speech is protected, not all speech is protected to the
same extent.107 In instances when commercial speech is regulated,
the Central Hudson test’s analysis calls for intermediate scrutiny in
order to balance protection for speech with the government’s in-
terests for the public.108 The Court held in Bolger v. Youngs Drug
Products Corp. that the Constitution provides a different level of
protection for commercial speech than other forms of speech.109
Justice Breyer underscored this point in his dissent in Garcetti v.
Ceballos when he stated the Court’s common understanding that
“virtually all human interaction takes place through speech,” and
thus “the First Amendment cannot offer all speech the same degree
of protection.”110 Hence, different categories for speech are neces-
sary and require judges to apply different levels of scrutiny.111
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id.; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770-71 (1976).
106. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
107. Id.; see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).
108. See Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868
F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2017) (calling for intermediate scrutiny for commercial speech); ROBERT
L. KERR, THE CORPORATE FREE-SPEECH MOVEMENT 218 (2008); Norton, supra note 45, at 83;
Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 414.
109. 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983).
110. 547 U.S. 410, 444 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d
at 112 (“[C]ommercial speech ... is afforded less protection than other constitutionally safe-
guarded forms of expression”); Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 871 F.3d 884, 891
(9th Cir. 2017) (determining that commercial speech regulations warrant a lesser standard
of review than “content-based regulations of noncommercial speech”).
111. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 444 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
716 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:701
However, later cases suggest that perhaps courts consider a high-
er standard of scrutiny for commercial speech.112 In the landmark
corporate speech case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Com-
mission, the Court held that corporations have First Amendment
rights for political speech, just as those of natural persons.113 This
calls into question the distinct levels of protection for political and
commercial speech; the Court elevated First Amendment rights of
corporations with respect to political speech to the same standard
as human speakers, and could do the same for commercial speech.114
In addition, the Court later held in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. that
the First Amendment necessitates heightened scrutiny for govern-
ment regulations of speech that the government disagrees with; this
includes commercial speech.115 These cases may show that the Court
has moved away from Central Hudson to apply a strict scrutiny
test.116 This view of the Court’s decisions makes the speaker, rather
than the interests of society, the focal point for commercial speech
restrictions.117 However, this is too broad of a reading of Citizens
United and Sorrell, as discussed later in this Part.
3. Deregulation Through the First Amendment
In addition to calls for a heightened level of scrutiny for commer-
cial speech, there has been a recent trend of affording corporations
greater free speech protection in the face of regulations.118 Instead
of protecting the listeners and focusing on the audience’s access to
information, the commercial speech doctrine has continually been
112. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011); Citizens United v. FEC, 558
U.S. 310, 349-50 (2010); PIETY, supra note 41, at 4.
113. 558 U.S. at 349-50; see also PIETY, supra note 41, at 29.
114. PIETY, supra note 41, at 4 (noting that to do so could “imperil existing consumer pro-
tection legislation and strangle ... any efforts to assert greater regulatory supervision over
critical industries”). 
115. 564 U.S. at 566 (holding that the consumer’s need for doctor prescription practices
made the regulation overly burdensome).
116. Id. at 565-66; see also Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 392-93 (noting that plaintiffs pro-
testing commercial speech restrictions have long challenged the Court to reject the Central
Hudson test and apply strict scrutiny).
117. Tamara R. Piety, “A Necessary Cost of Freedom”? The Incoherence of Sorrell v. IMS,
64 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2012) (arguing that the Court likely did not intend to “eviscerate[ ]” its
reasoning in Virginia State Board by focusing on commercial speakers instead of listeners). 
118. See Coates & Fein, supra note 93.
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used by corporations as a deregulation tool to rid themselves of
what they view as unnecessary regulations, such as compelled dis-
closures or privacy protection laws.119
The business movement for broader speech protections emerged
in the 1970s and has been strengthened by the current Court’s
approach to corporate speech in cases such as Citizens United and
Sorrell.120 Businesses have increasingly used the First Amendment
as a first line of defense, because almost any regulation relates in
some part to speech and expression.121 One scholar calls this use of
the First Amendment as a deregulatory tool “the new Lochner,”
except that free speech is an even stronger deregulation tool because
it “has the capacity to undo the state and transfer control of market
regulation from the political branches to the judiciary, if not ulti-
mately to the hands of free speech claimants.”122
John Coates, Professor of Law and Economics at Harvard Law
School, attributes this to what he calls the “corporate takeover of
the First Amendment.”123 Rather than simply allowing limited reg-
ulation in only instances when society’s interests are at stake, cor-
porations now constantly bring free speech claims to rid themselves
of any government regulation whatsoever.124 In the decades leading
up to the Court’s decision in Virginia State Board, business cases
made up approximately 20 percent of the Court’s docket on free
speech.125 That number has since doubled, and businesses’ speech
arguments are now successful at the same rate as individuals’.126
Thus, corporations have increasingly used the First Amendment
119. PIETY, supra note 41, at 1 (noting that businesses have strategically used litigation
to fight regulations of commercial speech and “have successfully changed judicial and public
attitudes” towards these regulations); Coates & Fein, supra note 93.
120. See Coates, supra note 82, at 241-42; Shanor, supra note 76, at 154-55 (citing Justice
Powell’s 1971 memorandum as the initial influence in framing business’s First Amendment
rights).
121. Shanor, supra note 76, at 177. 
122. Id. at 199.
123. See Coates, supra note 82, at 246. 
124. Id. at 265 (noting that this perpetuates a power imbalance between individuals and
businesses or employers). 
125. Coates & Fein, supra note 93.
126. Id.; Joe Pinsker, How Corporations Took Over the First Amendment, ATLANTIC (Apr.
1, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporations-took-over-
the-first-amendment/389249/ [https://perma.cc/UA69-J8JC].
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and the commercial speech doctrine effectively to evade government
regulation.127
4. Counteracting the Deregulation Movement and Heightened
Scrutiny
The Court in Citizens United, however, said nothing of commer-
cial speech or how the majority opinion affects other areas of pro-
tected speech.128 Furthermore, the Court has made clear in the past
that commercial speech is distinct from political speech.129 Central
Hudson still remains controlling precedent for analyzing commercial
speech.130 Although not explicitly stated, the Court in Sorrell applied
the analysis from Central Hudson to determine the substantial gov-
ernment interest in regulating the speech at issue, and whether this
regulation was narrowly tailored.131 The Court also determined that
content-based restrictions for commercial speech are permissible
and commercial speech may be regulated more than noncommercial
speech.132
In addition, circuit and district courts continue to apply the
Central Hudson test and intermediate scrutiny for commercial
speech.133 For instance, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where
the businesses are challenging the Philadelphia ordinance, has pre-
viously made very clear that Sorrell did not change the standard of
review for commercial speech as set forth in Central Hudson.134 The
127. Pinsker, supra note 126.
128. PIETY, supra note 41, at 29.
129. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1983) (“[W]e have held
that the Constitution accords less protection to commercial speech than to other constitu-
tionally safeguarded forms of expression.”); KERR, supra note 108, at 217.
130. See Norton, supra note 56, at 744 n.67; Piety, supra note 117, at 35. 
131. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 571-72 (2011).
132. Id. at 579.
133. See Retail Dig. Network, LLC v. Prieto, 861 F.3d 839, 847 (9th Cir. 2017) (determining
that Sorrell did not change the Central Hudson standard because the context for the Court’s
reference to “heightened scrutiny” is whether the statute regulates speech or commerce, and
thus any reference to heightened scrutiny for commercial speech was compared to the rational
basis review standard for merely commercial activity); Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de
Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2017); 1-800-411-Pain
Referral Serv., LLC v. Otto, 744 F.3d 1045, 1055 (8th Cir. 2014) (noting that Sorrell allows
for the same analysis as the Central Hudson test).
134. See King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 308 (E.D. Pa. 2012).
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court determined that the Supreme Court did not analyze the state
statute in Sorrell under either intermediate or strict scrutiny be-
cause the outcome would be the same either way.135 Consequential-
ly, the Supreme Court “stopped far short of overhauling nearly three
decades of precedent” and relied on commercial speech precedent,
including Central Hudson, to analyze the statute.136
This intermediate level of scrutiny is critical in protecting the
balance of power between the speaker and listener and ensuring
that the free speech rights of the speaker do not unduly burden the
audience.137 In addition, the Court adopted commercial speech to
protect the rights of the listener—and not the speaker—so the
government should still sufficiently regulate commercial speech to
protect the public interest in a way that passes intermediate scru-
tiny.138 If courts apply strict scrutiny to commercial speech regula-
tions, they effectively allow corporations to negotiate and conduct
commercial transactions virtually unhindered because of the high
standard a strict scrutiny analysis requires.139
The Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test already offers
protection to commercial actors from unwarranted government
interference.140 This test and level of scrutiny allows a company
to speak freely in matters that do not implicate substantial gov-
ernment interests, and protects these same companies from reg-
ulations that do not directly and narrowly advance those govern-
ment interests.141 Thus, applying an intermediate level of scrutiny
135. Id.
136. Id. (“If the Court wished to disrupt the long-established commercial speech doctrine
as applying intermediate scrutiny, it would have expressly done so. Absent express
affirmation, this Court will refrain from taking such a leap.”). 
137. See Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 402 (“Since commercial speech is ‘the offspring of
economic self-interest,’ only by maintaining intermediate protection for commercial speech
can we ensure that the bargaining process is fair and consumers are protected.” (quoting
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 n.6 (1980))).
138. Shanor, supra note 76, at 146.
139. See PIETY, supra note 41, at 4 (discussing how elevating commercial speech to strict
scrutiny endangers constitutional regulations); see also Piety, supra note 117, at 5 (finding it
unlikely that the Court meant to “eviscerate[ ] the rationale” underpinning Virginia State
Board and its protections for listeners in favor of strict scrutiny).
140. See Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 402.
141. See id. at 413 (writing that intermediate scrutiny reflects both government interest
in regulating commercial speech, and the “values inherent” in protecting that speech). 
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to regulations of commercial speech will not strip corporations of
their First Amendment rights.142
In addition, despite the corporate movement to cast all regula-
tions of corporate speech—including commercial speech—as wrong
and overly burdensome, not all of these regulations are as negative
or onerous as many corporations would have one believe.143 In the
wake of major financial scandals of the twenty-first century, such as
Enron and AIG, regulation in certain areas has been increasingly
embraced.144 This supports Justice Breyer’s view that the decision
to regulate in order to protect the safety and well-being of the public
should properly reside with the legislature instead of “a constitu-
tional decision prohibiting the legislature from enacting necessary
protections.”145
Moreover, commercial speech is a massive component of commer-
cial activity in this country. Marketing alone, the most common
form of commercial speech, generates six trillion dollars in economic
activity every year.146 The government cannot effectively exercise
its ability to regulate such a substantial part of commercial activity
if it is only permitted to do so after being subject to strict scrutiny.147
Furthermore, using commercial speech protections to fight any and
all business regulations defeats the primary purpose of the commer-
cial speech doctrine, which was to “secure the value of commercial
speech to society, not to ensure the autonomy interests of commer-
cial speakers.”148
Thus, courts should not permit the corporate use of the First
Amendment against regulations to erode the analysis of permissible
government regulation by submitting government regulation to
strict scrutiny. The Central Hudson test has endured for thirty
years,149 and there is still “no need ... to break new ground.”150 This
142. See id. at 402.
143. See PIETY, supra note 41, at 1-2.
144. See id. at 2.
145. Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 389 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(calling for “lenient application” of protections for commercial speech in order to protect the
public).
146. See PIETY, supra note 41, at 2.
147. See id.
148. Shanor, supra note 76, at 143.
149. Lora E. Barnhart Driscoll, Comment, Citizens United v. Central Hudson: A Ratio-
nale for Simplifying and Clarifying the First Amendment’s Protections for Nonpolitical
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test permits regulation if the regulation directly advances a sub-
stantial government interest and is not more restrictive than is
necessary.151 Therefore, courts should use the Central Hudson an-
alysis and intermediate scrutiny to determine whether salary histo-
ry legislation is permissible regulation.
III. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE GAP
In order for salary history bans to pass the Central Hudson test
for commercial speech regulation, the government must show that
it has a substantial interest in regulating the speech at issue.152
The substantial government interest inherent in salary history
bans can be found in the text of some of the ordinances them-
selves.153 For instance, in the Philadelphia ordinance, the City pub-
lished its findings regarding the wage gap that continues to persist
in Pennsylvania and the United States.154 It enumerated that the
purpose of the ordinance is to follow the legacy of the Equal Pay Act
(EPA) and eliminate factors that perpetuate the wage gap, in this
case by prohibiting inquiries into salary history.155 The EPA and
subsequent court cases demonstrate that the government has a sub-
stantial interest in narrowing the wage gap.156 However, they also
show deficiencies in the current legal regime157 and why further leg-
islation such as salary history bans are needed to further the gov-
ernment interest of narrowing the gender wage gap.
Advertisements, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 213, 213 (2011).
150. Thompson, 535 U.S. at 368 (reaffirming the Court’s commitment to the Central
Hudson test for commercial speech).
151. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
152. See id.
153. See PHILA., PA., PHILA. CODE § 9-1101(b), (e) (2017); S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33J,
§ 3300J.4 (2017).
154. PHILA., PA., PHILA. CODE § 9-1131(1)(a) (2017) (finding that women on average are
paid seventy-nine cents on the dollar as compared to men in Pennsylvania; when broken down
by race, many women of color are paid even less, with African-American women making sixty-
eight cents on the dollar and Latinas fifty-six cents on the dollar).
155. See id. § 9-1131(1)(b).
156. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205
(1974) (determining that different pay for men and women violated the EPA); Glenn v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that using market forces to pay
men and women differently violated the EPA).
157. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1982).
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A. Substantial Government Interest in Wage Equality
In 1963, Congress passed the EPA,158 which provided in part that
“[n]o employer ... shall discriminate ... between employees on the
basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at
a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex in such establishment for equal work.”159 The EPA
represents the interest of the government, and society as a whole,
in ensuring that “equal pay for equal work” is a statutory right.160
When the bill was debated in 1963, legislators noted during the
proposal and discussion of the EPA that it was meant to eliminate
a practice which is against “our national ideals concerning equal
rights and equal opportunities for women”161 and “our basic tradi-
tions of freedom and fair play.”162 The existing legislation in the
states at the time was “ineffective, inconsistently enforced, and
limited in coverage.”163 Thus, Congress enacted the EPA to be an
essential tool in combatting wage discrimination.164 That same
government and public interest that led to the EPA persists to this
day, and will, as long as the gender wage gap persists.
Subsequent court decisions emphasize this substantial govern-
mental and societal interest in wage equality through findings that
the use of prior salary in determining pay is contrary to the intent
of the EPA.165 For instance, in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, only
male employees worked the night shift due to state laws which
prohibited night work for women.166 The all-male night shift staff
earned a higher rate of pay than the all-female day shift.167 Once the
state eliminated the laws regarding shift distinctions, women and
158. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 2, at 167.
159. § 206(d)(1).
160. See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63
SMU L. Rev. 17, 29 (2010) (noting that “equal pay for equal work” was first enshrined in U.S.
federal law in the EPA).
161. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 2, at 167 (quoting 109 CONG. REC. 8915 (1963)
(statement of Rep. Randolph)).
162. Id. (quoting 109 CONG. REC. 9195 (1963) (statement of Rep. Powell)).
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See Carole Supowitz Katz, Wage Discrimination Claims: Employee’s Prior Salary Fails
the “Factor Other Than Sex” Test, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 217 (1984).
166. See 417 U.S. 188, 191 (1974).
167. Id.
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men still earned different wages because wages were based on the
previous discrepancy in shift pay.168 The Supreme Court found that
Corning’s reliance on prior wages in this instance violated the EPA
because it reflected a job market that valued men over women,
which was an unsuitable differential.169 It was the employer’s duty
to equalize base wages once the state eliminated shift distinctions
and to pay female inspectors the same rate as the male inspectors.170
The Court elaborated on this point in highlighting that equalizing
pay for women and men was the whole purpose of the EPA, so the
employers must equalize pay for reasons of justice and to eliminate
an “unfair method of competition” from the marketplace.171 There-
fore, the Court emphasized that sustaining pay based on prior sal-
ary violated the EPA because the discrepancy between the male and
female workers’ pay existed specifically because of the workforce’s
gender.172
Similarly, in Glenn v. General Motors Corp., the Eleventh Circuit
determined that an employer violates the EPA when it can only
account for wage discrepancy because of market forces that value a
male employee’s worth higher than a female employee’s worth.173 In
that case, General Motors paid a higher salary to the male employ-
ees arguing that the higher wages were necessary to hire the male
employees off the market and pay them consistently with their
previous wages.174 The court found that this argument was exactly
the type of disparity that Congress passed the EPA to combat.175
Hence, these cases show the emphasis that the Supreme Court and
lower courts have placed on overcoming market biases in order to
further the government and societal interest of eliminating pay
disparity in the wake of the EPA.
168. Id. at 192.
169. See id. at 205, 209-10 (finding that Congress made the pay differential illegal when
it “enacted into law the principle equal pay for equal work”). 
170. See id. at 206.
171. Id. at 207. Thus, any continued pay differential was merely Corning “taking advan-
tage” of the fact that women could work for less than men. Id. at 208.
172. See id.
173. See generally 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding for the three female plaintiffs
who sued because they earned less than their male counterparts in the same positions).
174. Id. at 1570.
175. See id.
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B. Shortcomings of the Wage Equality Legal Framework
Unfortunately, the current version of the EPA does not always
correct these market biases, so additional regulation is needed to
further the substantial government interest of equal pay. Employers
can still invoke an affirmative defense to justify paying men and
women differently.176 In the EPA, there are four affirmative de-
fenses for wage discrepancy when wages are based on “(i) a seniority
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings
by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on
any other factor other than sex.”177
Congress included the “factor other than sex” defense to allow for
a business’s own distinctions for job classifications.178 In theory, this
allows employers to exercise discretion while still seeking the goal
of eliminating gender-based wage disparity.179 However, the “factor
other than sex” defense is particularly pernicious in the way that it
allows employers and courts to ignore information to the contrary
in determining that prior salary is a factor not based on gender.180
For instance, in Kouba v. Allstate Insurance Co., Lola Kouba, on
behalf of a class of female employees, alleged that the defendant’s
use of prior salary to determine pay for new hires was unlawful
discrimination.181 The Ninth Circuit decided that the EPA “concerns
business practices,” so a company cannot pay men and women
differently “absent an acceptable business reason.”182 But the court
then concluded that despite valid fears that employers may “manip-
ulate its use of prior salary to underpay female employees,” the EPA
does not strictly prohibit using prior salary to determine compen-
sation.183
Thus, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that prior salary can in
fact perpetuate gender-based wage discrimination, but it still held
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
177. Id.
178. Katz, supra note 165, at 211.
179. Id. at 212.
180. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 2, at 177 (remarking that employers often win
even though “[c]ourts tend to scrutinize employer’s reliance on prior salary more closely than
competing offers and salary negotiation”).
181. 691 F.2d 873, 874-75 (9th Cir. 1982).
182. Id. at 876.
183. Id. at 878.
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that the “factor other than sex” affirmative defense allows busi-
nesses to explain away its use of salary history as an acceptable
hiring practice.184 But, as seen in the matter of Aileen Rizo, a com-
pany can implement a practice it believes is a sound business
reason—such as using salary history to classify income brackets—
and still perpetuate the wage gap in using this salary history.185
 Even when courts are skeptical of an employer’s dependence on
salary history, because of the “factor other than sex” affirmative
defense in the EPA, employers may still triumph if they can attest
that their dependence is an acceptable business reason.186 Thus, the
current statutory framework fails to address factors such as prior
salary that perpetuate the wage gap and inhibit the substantial
government interest of “equal pay for equal work.”187
C. Ineffectiveness of Salary History as a “Factor Other Than Sex”
In contrast to prior salary, courts have long considered market
forces an insufficient “factor other than sex,” and thus not an ade-
quate affirmative defense.188 As the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission Compliance Manual states, an employer may not assert
as an acceptable defense that the market value of a male employee’s
work is higher than a female employee’s work.189 “[P]ayment of low-
er wages to women based on an assumption that women are avail-
able for employment at lower compensation rates does not qualify
as a factor other than sex that would justify unequal compensation
for substantially equal work.”190 Therefore, the use of market forces
to justify lower wages is not acceptable as a defense under the
EPA.191
184. See id.
185. See supra notes 5-11 and accompanying text.
186. See Kouba, 691 F.2d at 878. 
187. See Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 29-30.
188. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974) (finding wage dif-
ferential based on job market illegal under the EPA); Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d
1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that the Court has “long rejected the market force theory
as a ‘factor other than sex’”); Elzer, supra note 13, at 25.
189. EEOC COMPL. MAN. 10-IV(F)(2)(g).
190. Id.
191. Id.
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And yet, prior salary really is not that distinguishable from mar-
ket forces.192 An employer’s excuse that a female employee is paid
less because of her prior salary is just repackaging the argument
that women are paid less as a reflection of the market value.193
The market itself, including prior salary, is biased because of
differing perceptions of men and women that rate a male employee’s
achievements higher than a female employee’s achievements.194 In
addition, although market forces are an impermissible reason to pay
men and women differently,195 prior salary incorporates past de-
cisions of market value and passes these decisions on to new em-
ployers via salary history.196 Therefore, courts should not consider
prior salary as an adequate “factor other than sex,” and should not
accept prior salary as an affirmative defense while rejecting market
forces.197
Furthermore, salary history is simply not that useful as a busi-
ness practice because it is not indicative of anything necessary to
successfully perform a given job, such as education, training, or ex-
perience.198 Moreover, it is inconsistent with the other defenses
enumerated by the EPA.199 Prior salary does not reflect time con-
siderations like a seniority system defense does.200 Nor is prior
salary useful for determining economic benefits of a prospective
employee, like the quantity or quality of production defense, because
prior salary does not necessarily indicate quantity or quality of
work.201 Finally, employers can examine other characteristics that
192. See Elzer, supra note 13, at 25 (calling prior salary and market forces “inextricably
linked”).
193. See id. (“Given the relationship between prior salary and bargaining power in many
of the negotiation cases, it is inconsistent to treat prior salary as an acceptable factor other
than sex, while treating market forces as an unacceptable one.”).
194. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 2, at 188-89.
195. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974).
196. Elzer, supra note 13, at 23-25 (asserting that the market influences how much value
women have, which is reflected in their salary). 
197. See id.
198. See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 2, at 197-98 (finding that prior salary does not
helpfully narrow an applicant pool because it “is not related to the skills and abilities of the
job in question”). 
199. See Katz, supra note 165, at 222-24.
200. See id. at 223.
201. See id. at 222-23. Katz further notes that salary history cannot typically predict future
economic benefits of an employee because it is based on previous factors that may not be part
of consideration for the current position. Id.
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many argue prior salary encapsulates, such as education and
experience, independent of salary history.202 In light of these con-
siderations, the importance of salary history dwindles to merely
representing the decisions of former employers based on factors that
may or may not be applicable to the current position.203
Courts are therefore too deferential to employers under the EPA’s
affirmative defenses in allowing them to justify the use of prior
salary as a “factor other than sex.” An employer’s need for flexibility
and autonomy, and the citizenry’s need for the elimination of
gender-based wage discrimination cannot always be simultaneously
fulfilled.204 Therefore, an employer’s need for autonomy should not
come at the expense of the public interest of equal pay.205
The EPA too easily permits employers to attest that the use of
prior salary is a business practice, and not a factor based on gen-
der.206 And yet, prior salary carries with it the very type of bias that
the EPA was meant to eliminate.207 Due to the invidious nature of
workplace discrimination based on gender, salary history should not
be viewed as a “factor other than sex” and should instead be seen for
what it is: a means of perpetuating prior bias towards employees
based on their gender. As long as the EPA continues to allow an
affirmative defense that enables the gender wage gap to persist,
legislation that bans salary history questions is necessary to further
the substantial government interest of wage equality first set forth
in the EPA.
IV. ADVANCEMENT OF PUBLIC INTEREST THROUGH REGULATION
In order for the government to permissibly regulate salary histo-
ry questions during the employment process, the regulation must
be narrowly restrictive and further the substantial government
202. See id. at 224 (arguing that education and work experience should be examined on
their own and not through prior salary because “[c]orrelation must not be confused with cau-
sation”). 
203. See id.
204. See id. at 212.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Porter
& Vartanian, supra note 2, at 177.
207. See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974); Glenn v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 841 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1988).
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interest.208 This final step in the Central Hudson test focuses on
whether the regulation “directly advance[s] the state interest in-
volved” and whether a more limited restriction would suffice.209 This
Part examines the narrowness of salary history bans and the ways
in which these regulations reasonably fit the stated interest of
narrowing the wage gap. Next, it responds to criticisms by demon-
strating that the law is not overly restrictive and burdensome to
employers.
A. Narrowness of Salary History Bans
Whether a regulation is appropriately restrictive is the most dif-
ficult prong of the analysis for a regulation on commercial speech to
clear.210 For example, in Virginia State Board, Virginia’s restriction
was improper because it “single[d] out speech of a particular content
and [sought] to prevent its dissemination completely.”211 Later, in
Central Hudson, the Court determined that the Public Service Com-
mission’s order directly advanced the state’s interest in conserving
energy, but the Commission was unable to show that a more limited
restriction would not suffice.212
The Philadelphia ordinance—as well as any subsequently lit-
igated salary history laws—however, should not meet this same
end because it still allows the disclosure and use of salary history
and does not prohibit all information relating to salary history.213
Employers can still use salary history to determine wages if the pro-
spective employee or recent hire “knowingly and willingly disclosed
his or her wage history.”214 Thus, banning employer salary history
208. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
209. See id.
210. See Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 429 (noting that another option usually leads the
Court to conclude that the government regulation is overly broad). 
211. Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
212. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 569-71.
213. See PHILA., PA., PHILA. CODE § 9-1131(2) (2017).
214. Id. This is the same for the Massachusetts law, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A
(2017), California law, CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (West 2018), Oregon law, OR. REV. STAT.
§ 652.220 (West 2017), New York City law, N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25) (2017), San
Francisco law, S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33J, § 3300J.4 (2017), a proposed New York State
bill, Assemb. B. 2040C, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017), and a proposed Delaware bill, DEL.
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questions is not as restrictive as the law in Virginia State Board
because it does not “seek[ ] to prevent [the information’s] dissem-
ination completely.”215 In addition, laws such as the Philadelphia or-
dinance should not meet the same end as the law in Central Hudson
because, as compared to the other laws banning salary history, Phil-
adelphia’s ordinance is not more restrictive and reasonably fits the
government’s desire to narrow the gender pay gap.216
1. Comparison of Salary History Bans
The Philadelphia ordinance subjects businesses to possible civil
or criminal penalties—including fines and a potential stint in jail for
a repeated offense—if they willfully and maliciously fail to comply
with the law.217 Critics of the Philadelphia ordinance point out that
this law is different than the Massachusetts law because it has an
absolute prohibition on inquiring into salary history.218
The primary difference between the two laws is that Massachu-
setts allows an employer to assert an affirmative defense if they can
show that they completed a good-faith self-evaluation in the past
three years and that “reasonable progress has been made” with
regards to the wage gap.219 However, both laws make it unlawful to
inquire into wage history, require disclosure of wage history, or
retaliate if a prospective employee or new hire does not provide
wage history.220 Furthermore, both laws prohibit the employer from
obtaining salary history from either the employee, or the employ-
ee’s current or former employer, unless the employee voluntarily
discloses salary history.221
CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 709B(6)(1)-(2) (2017). 
215. See Va. State Bd., 425 U.S. at 771.
216. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 570.
217. Áine Cain, An Employment Attorney Breaks Down the NYC Law that Just Eliminated
Everyone’s Least-Favorite Interview Question, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 11, 2017, 3:14 PM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/how-new-york-city-ban-salary-interview-question-works-2017-4
[https://perma.cc/9LZS-QKPN]; Cineas, supra note 29.
218. Fabiola Cineas, Comcast Has a Point on Pay Equity Bill, PHILA. MAG. (Jan. 13, 2017,
5:53 PM), https://www.phillymag.com/business/2017/01/13/pay-equity-bill-comcast/ [https://
perma.cc/5E4V-55JV]; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A (2017); PHILA., PA., PHILA.
CODE § 9-1131(2) (2017).
219. § 105A(d).
220. Compare § 105A, with § 9-1131(2).
221. Compare § 105A, with § 9-1131(2).
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Opponents to the Philadelphia ordinance point to the Massachu-
setts law’s “good faith” defense to show that a less-restrictive
regulation is available to Philadelphia and other places seeking to
pass legislation like this.222 Usually an alternative option that reg-
ulates less leads courts to conclude that a government regulation is
overly broad.223 But, as discussed above, allowing a company an af-
firmative defense for the use of salary history enables the company
to invoke business reasons for the use of prior salary while still per-
petuating the bias inherent to prior salary; thus, this does not di-
rectly advance the government interest.224
Moreover, the Massachusetts law is not the only benchmark
against which to compare the Philadelphia ordinance. California
signed a similar bill into law on October 12, 2017, which made a
violation of the law a misdemeanor.225 The California law also
prohibits an employer from seeking salary history, but allows the
employee to voluntarily disclose that information.226 Like Philadel-
phia and Massachusetts, this law also prohibits the employer from
relying on salary history information as a factor in determining the
offer or salary for an applicant.227
Oregon placed a similar bill into effect on October 6, 2017.228 That
law prohibits employers from determining compensation based on
current or past salary, and makes it unlawful to seek this informa-
tion from either the employee or former employer.229 Delaware’s,230
San Francisco’s231 and New York City’s232 laws are essentially the
222. Cineas, supra note 218.
223. Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 430; see also Centro de la Comunidad Hispana de Locust
Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 868 F.3d 104, 117 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that the ordinance
was not narrowly tailored because another regulation already accomplished the same task
without restricting speech).
224. See supra Part III.B.
225. CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (West 2018); Margot Roosevelt, California Bosses Can No





228. OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (2017).
229. Id.
230. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 709B(6)(1)-(2) (2017).
231. S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33J, § 3300J.4 (2017).
232. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107(25) (2017).
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same. New York State has not yet signed the bill into law, but it
follows the same provisions as those enumerated above.233 Thus,
only Massachusetts has allowed an affirmative defense.234 Other
states and cities have not included this provision in their laws and
still punish salary history questions.235 Therefore, the Philadelphia
ordinance is not an outlier, which is critical in finding that a less
restrictive means would not suffice.236
2. Reasonable Fit of Regulation to Interest
Additionally, the Supreme Court made clear in Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly that the regulation does not have to be the “least re-
strictive means” in order to be permissible.237 Instead it must merely
be a “reasonable ‘fit between the legislature’s ends and the means
chosen to accomplish those ends.’”238 The restriction need not be
perfect, but rather it must be reasonable.239 Hence, businesses
challenging the regulation cannot simply show that a less-restrictive
regulation is possible; rather they must show that the regulation
does not reasonably fit the city or state’s intended aim in minimiz-
ing the wage gap through the prohibition of salary history ques-
tions.
Justice Rehnquist cautioned the use of the “less restrictive
means” analysis in his dissent in Supreme Court of New Hampshire
v. Piper.240 He considered this analysis to be “both ill-advised and
potentially unmanageable” because it could be taken to the extreme
and used to strike down every government regulation because there
233. Assemb. B. 2040C, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
234. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 105A (2017) (providing an affirmative defense for
companies who have performed good faith assessments within the previous three years and
have made “reasonable progress ... towards eliminating wage differentials based on gender”).
235. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.3 (West 2018); N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (2017);
OR. REV. STAT. § 652.220 (2017); S.F., CAL., POLICE CODE art. 33J, § 3300J.4 (2017).
236. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 570
(1980).
237. 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632
(1995)).
238. Id. (quoting Went For It, 515 U.S. at 632).
239. Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
240. 470 U.S. 274, 294-95 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Cent. Hudson, 447
U.S. at 584-85 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (calling for greater deference to state regulations
because the State has the public interest in mind when enacting such regulations).
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can always be at least one less-restrictive way to write a law.241 If
courts interpret the Central Hudson analysis to indicate that only
the least restrictive means of regulation are allowed, then courts
will have gone to the extreme that Rehnquist cautioned against, and
strike down every government regulation of corporations.242
However, as we have seen in Lorillard Tobacco, the “least re-
strictive means” is not the standard; rather, the standard is whether
the regulation reasonably fits and is narrowly tailored to the leg-
islative intent.243 Salary history bans, including Philadelphia’s
ordinance, reasonably fit the public interest in that they enable the
government to regulate speech for the purpose of narrowing the
wage gap, and they are narrowly restrictive because they still allow
employees to voluntarily divulge such information.244
B. Responding to Regulation Criticisms
Despite criticisms of salary history legislation, common sense,
alternative means of determining pay, and corporate compliance
with these laws demonstrate that this legislation is not overly
restrictive or burdensome on employers.
1. Common Sense
Although Philadelphia’s ordinance is precisely a regulation that
is necessary and that reasonably fits the purpose of narrowing—and
eventually eliminating—the wage gap, critics of the law assert that
it is not based in empirical data proving that banning prior salary
questions will actually narrow the wage gap.245 Government reg-
ulation sometimes only passes the final prong of the Central Hudson
test if the government can point to empirical data to support the
restriction.246
241. Piper, 470 U.S. at 294-95 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist thought that this puts
too much power in the hands of judges and allows them to second-guess legislators on leg-
islative matters, which is an undesirable consequence. Id. 
242. See id.
243. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001).
244. See supra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
245. See Cineas, supra note 29.
246. Pomeranz, supra note 48, at 428.
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However, empirical data is not a requirement of the Central
Hudson test.247 The Supreme Court further made this clear in
Lorillard Tobacco when it held that studies and anecdotes about
different jurisdictions suffice, and justifications “based solely on
history, consensus, and ‘simple common sense’” are permitted.248
As argued above, history demonstrates that salary history per-
petuates the wage gap.249 “[S]imple common sense,” as Justice
O’Connor used in Lorillard Tobacco,250 also leads to the conclusion
that when a female employee is paid less based on her gender at one
workplace, then that lower salary will follow her for the rest of her
career, as long as employers continue to consider salary history in
determining pay.251
Critics point to the fact that laws banning salary history ques-
tions have not yet proven effective.252 However, it takes three to five
years to adequately study the efficacy of such laws.253 This should
not be a prohibitive barrier to the success of regulations such as
these. As Victoria Budson, the Executive Director of the Women and
Public Policy Program at Harvard points out, progress cannot be
limited to only those things that have been tested.254 The facts
indicate “when women—and particularly women and men of color—
get hired, people are more likely to underpay them. And when you
peg your offer and salary based on what someone’s made in their
last employment, you then replicate whatever discrimination people
have faced in prior jobs.”255
One cannot fall prey to the argument that you can only pass laws
once you have data on the law’s efficacy. Rather, you can only truly
study a law’s efficacy once it is enacted. The Supreme Court has
247. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980); see also Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 555.
248. 533 U.S. at 555 (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995) (finding
that even if the standard of review is strict scrutiny, these factors would pass such a review)).
249. See supra Part III.C.
250. 533 U.S. at 555 (internal citations omitted).
251. See Cauterucci, supra note 4.
252. See Editorial, A Gag Rule Won’t Help Women Advance, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 11, 2017,
9:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-11/a-gag-rule-won-t-help-women-
advance [https://perma.cc/337Z-A3S2].
253. Cauterucci, supra note 4.
254. Id.
255. Id.
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itself said that other factors, such as “history, consensus, and ‘sim-
ple common sense’” are adequate factors for determining whether a
regulation directly advances a government’s stated interest.256
Therefore, empirical data on the law’s efficacy is not necessary in or-
der to determine that the law directly advances the government
interest.257
In fact, the Supreme Court relied on Congress’s “commonsense
judgment” in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.258 In that case,
“commonsense judgment” was adequate to show that the regulation
directly advanced the state’s interest and permissibly regulated
commercial speech.259
All that is required in commercial speech cases is that there be a
“fit between the restriction and the government interest that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable.”260 Banning salary history rea-
sonably fits the government’s interest in narrowing the pay gap be-
cause of the effect that salary history has in perpetuating the wage
gap.261 In order for the Philadelphia ordinance and other similarly
written laws to permissibly regulate an employer’s commercial
speech, they need not work perfectly in every single instance to eli-
minate pay disparity, but they must reasonably further the stated
interest of narrowing the wage gap.262
2. Alternative Means of Determining Pay
Furthermore, the Philadelphia ordinance does not overly restrict
salary history information because, as shown above, it does not
prevent employers from accessing salary history information
256. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (quoting Fla. Bar v. Went For
It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 (1995)).
257. See id.
258. See 509 U.S. 418, 428 (1993) (relying on common sense to determine that lottery
advertisement broadcasts near the Virginia/North Carolina border would reach residents of
North Carolina and violate the state’s lottery laws).
259. Id. at 428-29 (“[T]he validity of restrictions on commercial speech should not be judged
by standards more stringent than those applied to expressive conduct entitled to full First
Amendment protection or to relevant time, place, or manner restrictions.”). 
260. Id. at 429.
261. See supra Part III.C.
262. See Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 429.
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altogether.263 Instead, it only regulates the employer’s ability to
seek and require it.264 The employee may still furnish that informa-
tion on her own,265 and employers can still ask about an employee’s
expectations regarding compensation during the hiring process.266
Therefore, the ordinance is unlike the laws in cases such as Virginia
State Board, because it does not prevent dissemination of the infor-
mation completely, but only restricts it in certain instances.267
In addition, the law is not overly burdensome to employers. It
may require more training for human resources personnel to
understand what is permitted under the law, but that is not a
prohibitive prospect.268 The law does not drastically restrict the
hiring process for employers because an employer may still nego-
tiate salary, discuss expectations, and evaluate education and ex-
perience.269 Employers can also still compare salary ranges to the
market when establishing different positions and adequate
compensation.270 Thus, employers are not left without any bench-
mark against which to compare a new salary.271
3. Corporate Embrace of Salary History Bans
Moreover, in the wake of salary history legislation, major com-
panies such as Amazon have proactively banned salary history
questions in order to work toward eliminating the gender wage
gap.272 Other companies, such as Google and Facebook, have applied
263. See supra text accompanying notes 213-16.
264. See PHILA., PA., PHILA. CODE § 9-1131(2)(a), (c) (2017).
265. See id. § 9-1131(2)(a).
266. Cain, supra note 217.
267. See Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771
(1976).
268. See Cain, supra note 217.
269. See Cain, supra note 217; Paula A. Monopoli, The Market Myth and Pay Disparity in
Legal Academia, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 867, 882 (2016); Tricia L. Nadolny, Chamber of Commerce
to Sue Philly Over Wage Equity Law, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 6, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.
philly.com/philly/news/politics/city/Chamber-of-Commerce-to-sue-city-over-wage-equity-
law.html [https://perma.cc/AC35-FKXH].
270. Cineas, supra note 218.
271. See id.
272. Valentina Zarya, Amazon Joins Growing List of Employers That Won’t Ask About
Your Salary History, FORTUNE (Jan. 18, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/01/18/amazon-salary-
history-wage-gap/ [https://perma.cc/28GT-9BWD].
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the salary history ban to their entire company, even though only
their offices in California are legally obligated to comply.273 This
initiative from some of the country’s most prominent multibillion
dollar corporations demonstrates that, rather than being overly
burdensome, these laws are actually embraced by major corpora-
tions.274
Laws regulating the use of, and questions related to, salary
history directly advance the goal, first presented in the EPA and
now furthered by states and cities across the country, of working
to eliminate the gender wage gap. Philadelphia’s ordinance in par-
ticular is directly tied and narrowly fits this goal of narrowing the
wage gap.275 Because of the availability of salary history through
other means and the alternative information available to employers
in the hiring process,276 these laws are not overly restrictive. There-
fore, salary history regulations should survive the final prong of the
Central Hudson analysis for permissible restrictions of commercial
speech.277
CONCLUSION
The use of salary history to determine starting pay is an injurious
business practice for those who were underpaid or undervalued in
their previous jobs because of their gender. For employees such as
Aileen Rizo, salary history unfairly limits salary options regardless
of education and experience, and makes it more likely that men and
women will be paid differently in the workplace. That is why laws,
such as the Philadelphia ordinance and those in other states, that
ban employer questions about salary history are critical in directly
273. Id.
274. See id.; see also Jena McGregor, Those Bans on Asking About Salary History? Most
Employers Don’t Think They’ll Work, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/11/16/those-bans-on-asking-about-salary-history-most-
employers-don’t-think-theyll-work/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c715485630f5 [https://perma.
cc/QF9Y-XH3A] (finding that 46 percent of 108 companies surveyed would implement the
legal requirement of one jurisdiction, such as Massachusetts, and apply to all of the company
operations across the country).
275. See supra text accompanying note 244.
276. See supra Part IV.B.2.
277. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
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advancing the government interest of “equal pay for equal work” set
forth in the EPA.278
Regardless of the outcome of the litigation in Philadelphia, courts
should classify questions related to salary history as commercial
speech because of the economic transaction implicit in questions
regarding a proposal and acceptance of an offer. Salary history
questions are also directly related to the job recruitment process,
just as solicitations for employment and job advertisements are.
As commercial speech, regulations of salary history questions
should be analyzed using the framework set forth in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, which looks to the substantial government interest involved
in regulating certain speech, and whether that regulation directly
advances the purported interest.279 Thus, courts should apply
intermediate scrutiny when conducting this analysis because of the
lesser protections accorded to commercial speech in an effort to
balance First Amendment rights with strong public interests.280
The Philadelphia ordinance and other similar laws that cities and
states across the country are increasingly passing explicitly carry on
the legacy of the EPA in seeking to narrow—and eventually elimin-
ate—the gender wage gap, a substantial government interest made
clear in the EPA and in subsequent court cases.281 Prohibiting sal-
ary history questions reasonably fits this stated goal without overly
burdening employers because they have access to other useful in-
formation in the salary decision process, such as education and ex-
perience.282 Courts must continue to evaluate commercial speech,
and thus salary history questions, under the intermediate scrutiny
standard. In doing so, these permissible government regulations of 
278. See Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 29-30 (writing that “equal pay for equal work” first
became federal law in the EPA). 
279. 447 U.S. at 566.
280. See supra Part II.B.2.
281. See supra Part II.A.
282. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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salary history questions will continue the critical work of narrowing
the gender wage gap.
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